Rethinking the Concept of Psychosis and the Link Between  Autism and Schizophrenia by Aggernæs, Bodil
4 
 
Scandinavian Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Psychology 
Vol. 4(1):4-x (2016) – Special Issue 
 
 





Rethinking the Concept of Psychosis and the Link Between  




Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Region Zealand, Roskilde, Denmark 
 
 




While searching for a connection among the four 
articles included in the present issue of SJCAPP—
and under the inspiration of both Craddock and 
Owen (1) as well as selected previous research on 
psychosis—I found myself on a trail leading back to 
Kraepelin.  
 
Prior experiences and delusion content  
The Italian pilot study by Catone and colleagues (2) 
in this issue focuses on the relationship between 
stressful experiences and delusion content in 
adolescents with psychotic disorders. The authors 
hypothesize that a biographic continuity or “thematic 
link” can develop between the themes of previous 
life experiences and the content of a patient’s 
delusions. They examine the relationship between 
the prior experiences and delusions of a sample of 16 
patients experiencing their first psychotic episodes. 
The researchers expected to find a statistically 
significant association between past experiences and 
psychotic symptom content, and they did discover a 
significant association between humiliating 
experiences and persecutory delusions. The authors 
suggest that the thematic link concept may provide 
clinicians with a greater awareness of the patient’s 
thoughts and emotions and that addressing past 
experiences and linking them to emerging or 
consolidated delusions may make experiences like 
bullying less frightening for the patient. 
 
How to make sense of delusions  
Although bullying may sometimes lead to psychosis, 
it more than likely will not. What triggers the 
development of psychosis? How and why are past 
experiences linked to psychosis in some patients? 
How do these experiences influence the content of a 
patient’s delusions?  
With regard to the psychopathology of delusions, 
the authors of the Italian pilot study (2) introduce 
Jaspers’ notion of “understandability” (3). They 
discuss the essential problem of whether it is possible 
to distinguish between primary or true delusions and 
secondary or delusion-like ideas (2). They ask 
whether the application of the term understandability 
should be related to the patient’s psychological 
history or to his or her life history, and they suggest 
the thematic link for use as a new way of interpreting 
classical psychopathology. The patient’s history may 
offer a historical understanding that is easier to 
comprehend as compared with a psychological 
understanding in phenomenological terms.  
In a recent article, Mishura and Fusar-Poli (4) also 
discussed Jaspers’ notion of understandability. They 
related his phenomenological approach to current 
neurobiological research. Those authors refer to 
Kapur and colleagues’ concept of “aberrant salience” 
(5). They suggest that primary delusions develop 
during the prodromal state to provide an explanation 
of the experience of the aberrant salience of 
innocuous stimuli that results from abnormal 
dopamine firing in the striatum (4).  
When considering the notion of understandability, 
in addition to the insight given by the patient’s 
psychological and life histories and the possible 
experience of aberrant salience, does it make sense to 
include knowledge about how an experience at both 
the conscious and unconscious levels forms through 
neurocognitive processing? If so, it will be important 
to realize how delusion content may be affected by 
cognitive impairment during the cognitive process of 





integrating the previous and present conscious and 
unconscious experiences. 
 
The origin of delusions 
The authors of the Italian pilot study (2) refer to two 
main hypotheses regarding the origin of delusions: 
the basic reasoning hypothesis and the anomalous 
experience hypothesis. Both of these hypotheses 
were formulated by Maher in an article that focused 
on the relationship between delusions and 
hallucinations (6). The basic reasoning hypothesis 
suggests that a basic defect exists in the reasoning of 
deluded individuals. According to Maher (6), this 
hypothesis dates back to Kraepelin (1889). The 
second hypothesis—the anomalous experience 
hypothesis—states that the delusion arises in 
response to an attempt to explain anomalous 
conscious experiences (6). In addition to these two 
hypotheses, the authors of the Italian study refer to a 
third transdiagnostic approach to delusions that was 
presented by Garety and Freeman (2). In a recent 
review of the empirical cognitive psychology 
literature about delusions, Garety and Freeman (7) 
updated the empirical evidence regarding the 
relevance of a cognitive model of positive psychotic 
symptoms that they had previously developed 
together with their co-researchers (8). This model 
highlights the contribution of psychological 
mechanisms that involve both emotional and 
cognitive reasoning processes (8). When applying 
this model to persecutory delusions, Freeman and 
colleagues (9) suggested that explanations considered 
during the search for meaning may be influenced by 
specific cognitive biases associated with psychosis, 
including theory of mind dysfunction as well as the 
jumping-to-conclusions bias and the attributional 
bias. At least three mediators may be involved in the 
choice of explanation: individual beliefs about mental 
illness, social factors, and little belief flexibility. The 
assumption that the emergence of symptoms 
depends on an interaction between vulnerability and 
stress underlies this model. However, as stated by the 
authors, it remains to be determined whether the 
cognitive biases associated with persecutory 
delusions are state or trait variables, and it is also not 
yet understood how psychotic processes, non-
psychotic processes, and the environment affect each 
other. To predict how and when precipitants in 
interaction with a given vulnerability lead to 
psychosis, the dynamics of these interactions will 
have to be included in the model. 
 
Subtyping thought disorders as a means of 
identifying subgroups 
The Danish study by Bundgaard Andersen and 
colleagues (10) in this issue explores the 
contributions of the Thought Disorder Index of the 
Rorschach Inkblot Method to clinical assessment, 
and it examines whether the Rorschach test is helpful 
for the assessment of early-onset schizophrenia as a 
result of its ability to detect thought disorder. In 
addition, the researchers examine whether the 
Thought Disorder Index is superior to the 
Comprehensive System, which is another simpler 
index of the Rorschach test. Although a small sample 
size limits the conclusions that can be drawn, the 
authors report results that indicate that specific types 
of thought disorder may be specific to schizophrenia, 
and they state that the Thought Disorder Index may 
be superior to the Comprehensive System. The 
authors conclude that, if their findings are replicated 
in larger studies, there may be implications for other 
assessments and for the subtyping of schizophrenia. 
Such findings may help to define the underlying 
mechanisms of the disorder itself. 
However, questions may remain about whether the 
identified subtle differences in the types of thought 
disorder are of any specific clinical or research 
relevance. This will be the case only insofar as these 
different types by themselves represent relevant 
targets for treatment or research. For example, do 
they represent specific domains of symptoms of 
relevance for the identification of early signs of 
psychosis or for preventive interventions in at-risk 
individuals? Do they reflect specific biomarkers that 
can be used in research efforts to identify subgroups? 
 
Exploring “experienced reality” 
Forty years ago, while analyzing the concepts of 
disturbed states of consciousness and psychosis, 
Aggernæs (11) suggested future clinical research 
should be inspired by the academic psychological 
literature addressing concepts related to defects in 
integration or differentiation and lack of coherence. 
Since then autism research has benefited from this 
type of approach. An example of this is reflected by 
the central coherence theory suggested by Frith in 
1989 (12). Cognitive theories of autism have guided 
autism research (13). One of the three main cognitive 
theories of autism focuses on impairments related to 
integrative processing (e.g. Frith (12)), another on 
executive dysfunctions.  
With inspiration from Piaget, Aggernæs and 
colleagues (14) developed a reliable clinical technique 
to investigate experienced reality and unreality 
qualities that are connected to everyday life 
experiences in psychotic and non-psychotic 
individuals. In contrast with projective techniques 
like the Rorschach test, the developed instrument 
provided a direct evaluation of reality testing and a 
more general evaluation than that obtained by 
methods that had been constructed to uncover 
hallucinations and delusions. The researchers went 
on to explore experienced reality in a series of clinical 





studies, including studies of 3- to 6-year-old children, 
non-psychotic adults, and patients with 
schizophrenia (14-16). The researchers found 
marked differences in the reality testing of children, 
non-psychotic adults, and schizophrenic patients. By 
the age of 3 years, children have already experienced 
real items as being real with regard to the reality 
qualities of behavioral relevance, publicness, 
objectivity, and existence in the same way that has 
been observed in non-psychotic adults. In addition, 
normal 3-year-old children showed a pronounced 
tendency to feel able to change the real world simply 
through acts of thought (magical thinking); this 
tendency was observed to have declined rapidly and 
nearly disappeared in 6-year-old children. The 3-year-
old children showed a pronounced tendency to 
experience imaginary items as being like real items 
and to think that they were not able to change such 
items simply by wanting them to change. This rigidity 
of thinking seemed to reach a peak in 5-year-old 
children and to decline thereafter; it was a rare 
finding in non-psychotic adults.  
In patients with schizophrenia, Aggernæs and 
colleagues (16) observed that patients with 
schizophrenia were more prone to experience non-
existing items as being real than to experience 
existing items as being unreal. In other words, these 
patients were more prone to a rigidity of thinking 
than to magical thinking. In conclusion, the authors 
stated “that “the real world” continues nearly 
completely to be real for schizophrenic patients but 
that there is an important tendency to experience the 
imaginary, non-existing world as being real too” (16).  
 
The link between autism and schizophrenia 
Is it possible that this rigidity of thinking may reflect 
the core of a link between autism and schizophrenia? 
Could this be what connects the two disorders at the 
phenomenological level? In patients with autism, this 
rigidity is observable at the clinical level as a concrete, 
inflexible, and at times even literal type of thinking 
that—regardless of the patient’s cognitive level—
may reflect difficulties with the handling of symbolic 
or abstract language concepts. Although it is 
sometimes directly observed in patients with 
schizophrenia, the rigidity of thought identified by 
Aggernæs and colleagues may be less apparent at the 
clinical level. However, from a neurocognitive 
perspective, these cognitive impairments may be 
comparable in nature but less severe to those seen in 
patients with autism. In other words, cognitive 
impairments of the same type and origin may operate 
at different levels of cognitive complexity in patients 
with autism and patients with schizophrenia. This 
would be comparable to the different levels of 
complexity of thought and reasoning distinguished 
by Piaget and suggested by him to relate to several 
different cognitive stages of development (17). 
Torres and colleagues (18) referred to Piaget’s theory 
of intelligence and the development of thought in a 
study that compared a group of schizophrenic 
patients with a group of healthy controls using the 
Longeot Logical Thought Evaluation Scale, which is 
a non-verbal psychometric instrument. Their results 
showed marked differences between the two groups, 
with the schizophrenic patients performing at lower 
cognitive levels as compared with the control group. 
These findings were consistent with those of 
Aggernæs and colleagues (16).  
The suggested view of a link between autism and 
schizophrenia may be consistent with a model of the 
complex relationship between biological variation 
and some major forms of psychopathology that was 
recently proposed by Craddock and Owen (1). Those 
authors also support the need to reconsider a 
relationship between psychotic disorders and other 
neuropsychiatric phenotypes (e.g., autism). They 
refer to evidence that shows that structural genomic 
variants are a common cause of genetic variation in 
humans and that such variants are present in 
neuropsychiatric phenotypes, including autism, 
intellectual disability, and schizophrenia. 
 
Beliefs and practices of treatment 
It has long been recognized that cognitive deficits 
may be involved in the development of psychosis and 
the pathogenesis of schizophrenia (19). Even so, 
treatment seldom directly addresses the specific 
cognitive deficits involved and instead focuses on the 
level of psychosis, with the aim of reducing the 
abnormal experiences with the use of antipsychotic 
medical treatment. Alternatively, treatment may 
indirectly address cognitive impairments with the use 
of social support or psychotherapeutic strategies to 
help patients cope with their symptoms. 
In the third article in this issue, Haapasalo-Pesu 
and colleagues (20) demonstrate a several-fold 
increase in the prescription of antipsychotics for 
children and adolescents that occurred during the 10-
year period from 2000 to 2010, according to their 
nationwide register study from Finland. The authors 
state that the prescription of antipsychotic 
medication to minors is common and that there is 
frequent off-label use of antipsychotics, despite 
accumulating evidence of serious side effects. The 
lack of scientific data supporting these prescriptions 
is a serious problem that is addressed by the authors.  
The growth in the prescription of antipsychotics 
may reflect a strong belief in hypotheses that suggest 
that mental illnesses, including psychoses, result 
from the dysfunction of certain neurotransmitter 
systems. However, antipsychotic medications have 
been shown to be of only moderate effect for the 
treatment of schizophrenia. Unfortunately, as stated 





by Garety and Freeman (7), no major breakthrough 
took place for the treatment of schizophrenia from 
2000 to 2010, regardless of whether medication, 
psychological therapies, or social interventions were 
considered. 
 
Developmental disorders in “adult disguise” 
Symptoms of schizophrenia may evolve via several 
different pathways, thereby reflecting the fact that 
brain events initiated at different levels are involved 
in the pathogenesis of the disease. 
Increasing evidence suggests that information-
processing deficits, neurocognitive impairments, and 
genes involved in schizophrenia may be of essentially 
the same nature as those observed in children with 
neurodevelopmental disorders. Therefore, it may be 
plausible to assume that differences in the severity of 
illness, the comorbidity of conditions, age-related 
symptom expression, and a focus on psychosis may 
be what separate childhood neurodevelopmental 
disorders from schizophrenia at the clinical and 
phenomenological levels. If so, schizophrenia may in 
fact be childhood neurodevelopmental disorders in 
“adult disguise.” This is consistent with the observed 
heterogeneous character of schizophrenia, the 
suggestion that the term may apply to several varied 
conditions (21-23), and the varied effects of 
antipsychotic medical treatment that have been 
observed in affected patients (24-25). Differences in 
the severity and type of information-processing 
deficits and neurocognitive impairments, together 
with the overall degree of neurobiological 
involvement, may contribute to the polymorphous 
and heterogeneous character of schizophrenia. 
Consistent with this hypothesis is that fact that 
increasing evidence suggests that schizophrenia 
shares common genes with autism and attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (26-34). Furthermore, 
autism, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and 
schizophrenia may share neurocognitive 
impairments (35-43) and certain symptoms (44-46). 
From a genetic perspective, many genes—and not 
always the same ones—may be involved, with each 
one contributing only small psychopathological 
effects (23). Recent results from genome-wide 
association studies support this hypothesis and show 
genetic overlap among several major psychiatric 
disorders, including schizophrenia and autism 
spectrum disorders (30,33). Increasing evidence 
suggests that rare genetic variants of moderate to 
large effect size may play an important role in the 
development of neuropsychiatric disorders as 
demonstrated by several studies involving the 
genome-wide analysis of copy number variants 
(28,31,34). These results show an overlap in copy 
number variant loci in patients with schizophrenia, 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and autism 
(28,31,34). The gene expression may depend on 
complicated interactions between genetic and 
environmental factors; for example, it is likely that 
schizophrenia develops as a result of an interaction 
between genetic liability and the negative impact of 
environmental factors (47).  
From a neurobiological perspective, deficits in 
information processing make up a basic vulnerability 
that is present before the development of manifest 
disease (19). Consistent with the present hypothesis 
is the idea that information-processing deficits are 
not specific to schizophrenia; they may also be 
present with other neuropsychiatric disorders (48-
50). Several neurocognitive and psychophysiological 
measures are considered candidate endophenotypes 
in patients with schizophrenia (36-37,51).  
The significance of basic cognitive impairments 
(e.g., dysfunctions of executive functions, working 
memory, or perception) may depend on and be 
related to the level of global intellectual functioning. 
This is consistent with evidence that indicates that a 
lower premorbid level of intelligence may increase 
vulnerability to schizophrenia (52). In addition, 
intelligence may genetically overlap with known 
cognitive endophenotypes for schizophrenia (53). 
Alcohol and drug abuse may further contribute to 
the development of manifest disease, with alcohol 
acting via a genetic pathway at the neurobiological 
level and via the environment at the social level (54).  
 
Psychosis as a social signal  
From a neurodevelopmental point of view, over the 
course of an individual’s development, cognitive 
challenges increase from childhood through 
adolescence and into adulthood. The relationship 
between the development of the brain and resulting 
behavior is complex, with evidence suggesting that 
changes in the structural brain mirror functional 
changes that coincide with improvements in 
cognitive and behavioral skills (55). Although 
subcortical structures appear similar to their adult 
forms at birth, the cerebral cortex is immature in 
terms of connectivity between and within regions, 
and it continues to develop into adulthood. 
According to Parson and colleagues (55), the timing 
and changes of connectivity during the course of 
development and their relationship to environmental 
factors (e.g., the important parent-child relationship) 
require much further exploration, including the 
obtaining of longitudinal structural information and 
more fine-grained temporal and spatial information 
about the functional neuroanatomy of infant brain 
activity.  
As suggested by Garety and Freeman (7) and 
Freeman and colleagues (9), stress, anxiety, and 
depression may worsen already present cognitive 
impairments, thereby contributing to the appearance 





of symptoms and increasing the risk for manifest 
disease. Stress may be triggered by major life events, 
trauma, or drug misuse.  
With reference to the different cognitive stages of 
development suggested by Piaget (17), it may be 
hypothesized that—across the course of 
development and with normal distribution at 
different levels of cognitive complexity—some 
individuals may reach the limits of their cognitive 
abilities. In addition to stress that results from major 
life events and trauma, some individuals may be 
predicted to experience more enduring stress merely 
as a result of events related to normal development. 
A cognitive challenge may arise for adolescents and 
young adults when they leave home and have to cope 
all by themselves in an increasingly complex reality. 
Until then, family and school may have compensated 
for minor impairments in cognitive function or social 
ability. With increasing age, social expectations are 
likely to increase; this time increases pressure on the 
executive functions involved in the tasks of planning 
and flexible adjustment according to context in 
addition to the need to be able to handle abstract 
thoughts and to engage in hypothetical reasoning and 
metacognition. Under these conditions, stress may 
develop as a result of a discrepancy between the 
cognitive abilities of and the cognitive challenges 
presented to vulnerable individuals.  
Why do apparently normal and even very 
intelligent people develop psychosis? Why do they 
not question their unrealistic ideas? Why is it that 
people in the social environment—including health 
care professionals—often do not realize until full 
symptoms appear that individuals who go on to 
develop schizophrenia are vulnerable and at risk? 
As proposed by Kapur and colleagues (5), 
psychosis may be a dopamine-mediated state of 
“aberrant salience” of stimuli and ideas. 
Antipsychotic medications may dampen the salience 
of these symptoms via the modulation of the 
mesolimbic dopamine system. The experience of 
aberrant salience that results from an increased 
dopaminergic level may contribute to the realistic 
quality of an experience, thereby reinforcing the 
sense of reality of the experience. This may 
contribute to a resistance to questioning the content 
of the experience. In this way, psychosis may act as a 
signal that is transmitted at the social level that makes 
the rest of society aware of processes taking place 
within an individual. 
 
Rethinking the concept of psychosis 
Psychosis may develop as a result of a primary 
dysfunction in the dopaminergic system and related 
transmitter systems, with reactions to these 
dysfunctions molding the individual’s experience (5). 
This prevalent hypothesis is consistent with the 
previously mentioned anomalous experience 
hypothesis (6), and it may be in line with the 
suggestion by Mishura and Fusar-Poli of a 
relationship between the experience of aberrant 
salience and primary delusions (4).  
In addition to hypotheses suggesting that psychosis 
results from dysfunctions in neurotransmitter 
systems, is it possible for psychosis to consist of a 
purely natural phenomenon that involves sensing or 
understanding the salient features of a cognitive 
experience that may reflect a distorted picture of 
reality? If this is the case, cognitive impairments with 
no measurable abnormal changes within the 
neurotransmitter systems may be sufficient for 
psychosis to develop. The individual may not be 
aware that his or her thinking deviates from normal. 
In contrast with—although inspired by—the 
hypothesis suggested by Kapur and colleagues (5) is 
the idea that psychosis may consist of a state of 
“normal salience” of aberrant experienced stimuli or 
ideas. The experience of normal salience may involve 
a transient elevation in the dopaminergic level within 
the normal range that may contribute to the realistic 
quality of the experience by enhancing its salience. 
Because changes in the dopaminergic level may not 
necessarily be present for this kind of psychosis to 
develop, antipsychotics may be less effective. This 
last definition of psychosis may be in line with the 
basic reasoning hypothesis suggested by Maher (6) 
while referring to Kraepelin (1889). It may also be 
consistent with the suggestion that the rigidity of 
thought observed in patients with schizophrenia may 
reflect the same cognitive impairments that are seen 
at a more severe level in patients with autism and 
with the observation that patients are more prone to 
experiencing non-existing items as being real than to 
experiencing existing items as being unreal (16).  
 
ESSENCE and developmental history  
Society may affect mental illness by defining mental 
disorders, including psychosis and schizophrenia, as 
diagnostic constructs or phenomena (i.e., as 
categorical or dimensional representations of 
psychopathology or gestalts) (1,22,56-59). It is likely 
that symptoms may develop in processes depending 
on how they are conceived and defined and that 
these processes may therefore themselves influence 
the course of illness. 
A few years ago, Gillberg (57) introduced the term 
ESSENCE—Early Symptomatic Syndromes 
Eliciting Neurodevelopmental Clinical Exam-
inations—to cover a group of often-overlapping 
neurodevelopmental syndromes observed in 
preschool children and to point out the risk of 
overlooking some symptoms while focusing on 
others. With the introduction of the acronym, 
Gillberg sought to acknowledge that these 





syndromes are to some extent arbitrary endpoints or 
cutoff points on normal distribution curves, with 
most syndromes comprising a mixture of symptom 
collections from different normal distribution 
curves. Rather than being discrete categorical 
disorders, these syndromes represent brain 
dysfunctions and neurodevelopmental problems. 
Children who present with ESSENCE problems 
require assessment from a multifactorial and 
multidisciplinary point of view.  
Instruments that can be used to collect develop-
mental history information, like the Motor Skills 
History Form and the Developmental and Motor 
History Form offered by Reiersen, author of the final 
article in the present issue (60), may be useful to 
enhance the level of developmental and psychiatric 
history gathered during clinical assessment. The 
author is in line with Gillberg when she states that 
such tools may assist with decision making related to 
further diagnostic testing in addition to providing 
information that is relevant to treatment needs and 
patient prognosis. Although the collection of 
developmental history information is an important 
part of the clinical assessment of neuro-
developmental disorders in children, it may not 
necessarily be part of the clinical evaluation of an 
adult patient with schizophrenia. The traditions of 
clinical assessment in the fields of child and 
adolescent psychiatry and adult psychiatry may differ, 
with a stronger emphasis being placed on 




The field of psychiatry appears to be at a crossroads. 
To secure the progress of psychiatric research and 
clinical practice, there is a need to revise concepts, 
methods, and overall models and to integrate 
knowledge from different fields. A fruitful approach 
may involve focusing research on the interface 
between normal and deviant thinking and relating 
processes at the genetic, physiological, cognitive, 
psychological, and social levels. As suggested by 
Craddock and Owen (1), models of mental illness will 
have to consider both normal and abnormal brain 
function, and psychiatry research will have to 
integrate evidence from various levels (e.g., 
molecular biology, cognitive and affective 
neuroscience) to move toward a coherent 
understanding. Such a strategy could focus on what 
separates normal from deviant thought processes 
and whether both can be present at the same time. 
Future research is encouraged to focus on the tasks 
of identifying when, how, and why thought and 
perceptual processes deviate from typical 
development; defining normal and abnormal; and 
suggesting methods to identify the mechanisms 
behind all possible levels involved. The suggested 
neurodevelopmental approach, the cognitive link 
between autism and schizophrenia, and the added 
general concept of psychosis may serve as steps in 
this direction. 
From a clinical perspective, the application of 
complex multilevel models in research may add to 
our knowledge of the multifaceted nature of mental 
illness. It may also encourage clinicians to employ 
multiple strategies for the treatment of schizophrenia 
and related disorders and to differentiate treatment 
according to more specific knowledge of the 
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